A guided systems case · about 30 minutes

The curator’s message

An archive sends a confidential donor agreement to a curator. Who can read it, who can infer the relationship, and what remains exposed after a key is revoked?

Begin with the decision

This original fictional case connects existing experiments. It does not send a message, attack a device or estimate the security of an actual archive. Use invented notes only; worksheet text stays in this page and is lost on reload.

Assets: the agreement’s content, the donor–archive relationship, authentic curator identity and the ability to stop using a compromised key. The sender and recipient devices, public key copies and relay operators are separate trust boundaries.

1 · Establish whose key it is

In Web of Trust’s independent observer experiment, create both copies, issue a revocation and deliver it only to A. Compare their received records and Curator verdicts. Send the forged record to B, then deliver the genuine one. Change only B’s local owner trust.

Compare PKI Chain: which authority is the trust anchor? These are distinct trust models; a valid signature alone does not establish who a person is.

2 · Follow every copy

In Key Lifecycle, copy the old key and ciphertext into the attacker archive, rotate and re-encrypt, then discard the local old key. Retest the archived copy. Distinguish future protection from data already exposed.

3 · Separate content from metadata

In Blind Relay, inspect the relay and gateway views and the non-collusion assumption. Record which operator sees source identity and which sees request content. Do not infer complete anonymity from encrypted content.

4 · Make the attacker assumptions explicit

In Model Breach, identify the toy oracle’s powers and restricted secret space. Its computed recovery is a bounded experiment, not a demonstrated compromise of the archive’s endpoint or a production cipher.

The tree below is a separate declared capability model. “AND” requires both children; “OR” requires either path. Ticking an endpoint copy assumes access—it executes no endpoint exploit.

  • Read content — OR: readable endpoint copy; AND: archived ciphertext plus its matching decryption key.
  • Infer relationship — AND: observe relevant traffic plus associate endpoints with identities. A relationship does not reveal the agreement or prove an intention.
Assume the observer can access…

5 · Write a bounded response

Identify the suspected compromise, stop new use of the affected key, distribute an authenticated revocation, establish and verify a replacement, and assess old ciphertext and endpoint copies separately. Decide what notification and recovery the fictional archive needs from the evidence you actually observed.

No security score is computed. A missing modeled attack path is not a proof of safety.

Reading connections

Bruce Schneier, Secrets and Lies: Digital Security in a Networked World (2004 edition), chapters 19–21, connects threat modeling, policy and attack trees. His “Attack Trees” (1999) explains AND/OR decomposition. The archive scenario and worksheet here are original.

Philip R. Zimmermann, The Official PGP User’s Guide (1995), printed pp. 31–34, and Simson Garfinkel, PGP: Pretty Good Privacy (1995), printed pp. 183–184, inform the distinction between signed records and local trust. The linked labs explain their implementation limits.